Monday, March 18, 2024

Book News: UNION "Tales of the War" in the Trans-Mississippi

Camp Pope Publishing's Unwritten Chapters of the Civil War West of the River series, edited by Michael Banasik, is a great personal favorite of mine, its volumes chock full of invaluable first-person accounts, documents, maps, copious editorial notes, detailed orders of battle, and more. Volume VII of the series, Confederate "Tales of the War" in the Trans-Mississippi, was released in five parts published between 2010 and 2019. All were reviewed on the site [to refresh your memory, visit these CWBA review links: Part One 1861, Part Two 1862, Part Three 1863, Part Four 1864, and Part Five 1864-1865].

With all that series background stuff out the way, the news item of the day is that the long-awaited first installment of the Union side of the "Tales of the War" collection is now available. Follow this link: [Camp Pope Publishing] and you'll find more information about Union "Tales the War" in the Trans-Mississippi - Part 1: 1861.

From the description: Part One "covers the events in Missouri that led up to Missouri reluctantly entering the Civil War, including the war preparations in St. Louis, the arrival of Nathaniel Lyon in St. Louis, and the role he played in preparing the Union side for the eventual conflict in Missouri. Also included, you will be introduced to the Missouri secession crisis and the capture of Camp Jackson on May 10, 1861, which propelled Missouri into the Civil War. The 1861 volume of this series includes extensive accounts on the Battles of Carthage (July 5, 1861), Wilson’s Creek (August 10, 1861), and, to a lesser extent, the Battle of Belmont on November 7, 1861, as related by the pilot of General Grant’s headquarters vessel, the Belle Memphis. This volume also includes several appendices covering official correspondence, various biographies, and extensive Orders of Battle for the major engagements in 1861 Missouri."

If you missed out on the earlier Unwritten Chapters books, scroll to the bottom of the CPP page linked above and you'll find that all of the Volume I-VII titles are still in print.

Friday, March 15, 2024

Booknotes: Texas Coastal Defense in the Civil War

New Arrival:

Texas Coastal Defense in the Civil War by William Nelson Fox (Arcadia Pub and The Hist Press, 2024).

Through both central government edict and an earnest desire to participate in the biggest battles on the most active fronts, Texans fought in all three major theaters of war. Doing so, however, stretched the state's manpower and materiel resources so thin that countering threats closer to home proved extremely challenging. And those threats were numerous.

On the vast and sparsely settled western frontier, Texans suddenly became responsible for their own protection against Comanche and Kiowa raids (the frequency and ferocity of which increased after the departure of the Regular Army). One of the most pressing reasons behind inking alliance treaties with the tribes inhabiting Indian Territory was the creation of a buffer between Texas and aggressive Union forces operating out of Kansas. The long international boundary with Mexico also had to be guarded against cross-border raids. Even with all of those weighty home front concerns to worry about, the greatest vulnerability lay in Texas's hundreds of miles of coast line that could not possibly be defended everywhere against Union naval superiority and its ability to sustain large-scale amphibious operations.

Existing coverage of the war along Texas's Gulf coast is quite good, with numerous quality book-length studies of operations at Galveston, the mouth of the Rio Grande (and some distance inland), Sabine Pass, and other places. In addition to that, a number of excellent journal articles cover Union amphibious attacks along the state's extensive stretch of barrier islands. Adopting a popular-style, bird's-eye approach to the topic is William Nelson Fox's new book Texas Coastal Defense in the Civil War.

From the description: Fox's book focuses on the Texas defenders who "resolutely weathered naval bombardments and repulsed invasion attempts. It was only at the end of the conflict that Federal troops were able to make their way into South Texas, as the Confederacy prepared its last stand at Caney Creek and the Brazos River. From famous battles to obscure skirmishes, William Nelson Fox provides an account of the Lone Star State's defensive strategies during the Civil War."

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

Review - "Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation" by Robert Tanner

[Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Robert G. Tanner (University of Tennessee Press, 2023). Softcover, 17 maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, notes, bibliography, index. Pages:xviii,200. ISBN:978-1-62190-769-5. $29.95]

University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America's Civil War continues to provide a fresh and unique methodology through which to rethink Civil War campaigns and battles that already have extensive narrative history coverage. Published last year, Robert Tanner's Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles one of the war's most dynamic military operations.

For those new to the series, a critical decision is defined as "a choice of such magnitude that it shaped not only the events immediately following it, but also the campaign from that point forward" (xiii). Analytical discussion proceeds through five stages—"Situation," "Options," "Decision," "Result(s)/Impact," and "Alternate Decision/Scenario." "Situation" describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the course of the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the decision "Options" (most frequently two or three in number) that immediately follow. The historical "Decision" is then outlined, usually very briefly, before the "Result(s)/Impact" section recounts what happened historically and how those events shaped the rest of the battle/campaign and beyond. The best "Situation" and "Result(s)/Impact" sections reference earlier decisions in meaningful ways, making clear the cascading consequences of critical decisions made earlier. Not present for every decision, the optional "Alternate Decision/Scenario" section delves into alternative history conjecture based on choices not made.

An active campaign that involved a great many troops in aggregate (especially on the Union side) but only resulted in relatively small battles at any given moment, the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign was rife with drastic order of battle changes (as major formations on either side regularly entered and exited the Shenandoah) and momentous strategic and operational pauses and resets of both geographical positioning and initiative. All of that is well represented in Tanner's critical decision selection and characterization, which has very few (two) tactical-level decisions and a great many others involving strategy, operations, and (re)organization.

The sixteen decisions compiled in the book are organized into six chapters with a time scale stretching from February 1862 to mid-June of that year. Together, they "examine decisions made at the campaign's outset, the Battle of Kernstown and a subsequent major reorganization of Union forces, Confederate plans and marches during April and early May 1862, Federal concentration outside the valley while Confederates concentrated and attacked in the Shenandoah during the pivotal second half of May, the Union's counterstrike against the Confederate offensive, and decisions to end the campaign" (xiv). Option numbers are typically in the two or three range (mostly the former), consistent with the rest of the series. There is a five-option decision, perhaps unprecedented in the series, that really illustrates well the sheer number of critical concerns, of both dangerous and opportunistic varieties, that confronted Jackson at a key moment. Modern armchair observers frequently dispute the brilliance of the Valley Campaign's result as being a function of B and C-team leadership opposition, but the author's critical decision analysis staunchly reinforces the book's argument that deliberative Confederate agency at numerous watershed moments was just as significant as Union bungling when it came to determining victory or defeat in the valley.

That there are eight critical decisions for each side supports the notion that both opposing leaderships possessed ample opportunities for seizing overall initiative. That a great many of the decisions were made by Abraham Lincoln also clearly demonstrates the degree to which the frustrated U.S. president personally seized the directing reins of the Union war effort in Virginia during the time of this campaign, to frequently poor result. Excepting Chapter Three, in which all three critical decisions are Confederate-sourced, Lincoln figures in all the remaining five chapters (by direct decision-making in four of those and in heavily shaping the George McClellan decision made in the remaining one). Throughout all six chapters, Tanner appropriately stresses interconnectivity when it comes to assessing decisions and events in the Shenandoah, Allegheny mountains, north and central Virginia, and Virginia Peninsula fronts. Showing how and why what happened in the Shenandoah Valley during the spring months of 1862 had a tremendous impact on military fortunes across Virginia is a strong element of Tanner's campaign analysis.

The series has always stressed to its readers that decision options are selected for their capacity to set or change the course of a campaign, and thus should not be seen as necessarily good or bad (or right or wrong). Indeed, in order for a choice to represent a real option it must have some strong basis for consideration, and Tanner does an exceptionally fine job of articulating the opportunities, feasibility, risk-levels, and potential pitfalls involved with each decision-making process. Properly eschewing the no-brainer approach, every option is assigned one or more supportable reasons for it to exist in the mind of the decision maker. Not all of the books in the series achieve this process as strongly as Tanner's does here. One of the best examples of that quality can be found in Tanner's dispassionate and keenly analyzed assessment of John C. Fremont's much-pilloried decision not to move on Harrisonburg during the late May-early June Union offensive aimed at trapping and destroying Jackson's army in the valley. In addition to the president himself, subsequent writers and historians have often been dismayed by Fremont's failure to fulfill Lincoln's directive, but Tanner pretty convincingly shows that the wording of the order was more ambiguous than Lincoln apparently intended. That factor, combined with pressing issues of time, distance, supply and logistical constraints, lack of information regarding an overall plan (including the positions of other friendly columns), and other considerations, rendered Fremont's ultimate decision far from being a cut and dried example of egregious blunder or a direct disobeying of orders (though Tanner justly condemns Fremont for not seeking clarification).

The series defines critical decisions very narrowly, but the reality is that no two individuals, no matter how well informed in regard to the topic at hand, would come up with the exact same list of options and scenarios. As one example here, in Chapter Two, one might be justified in deeming the higher-level operational decision to regain lost contact with federal forces in the Lower Shenandoah, the bulk of which were understood to be leaving, to be a more 'critical' decision than the tactical-level one presented in the book in which Jackson must decide to either attack immediately or on the following day.

Some analyses offer tidbits not often appreciated in the literature's extensive discussions of those events. A good example is Tanner's coverage of Edwin Stanton's assignment of General William S. Rosecrans to find Louis Blenker's "lost" division and expedite the effort in getting the recently formed Mountain Department shipshape. Also mentioned is the Secretary of War's brusque rejection of Rosecrans's unsolicited suggestions regarding coordinated operations in the East and the absence of a single guiding force with a military background. It's a small part in the play to be sure, but something worthy of consideration in assessing the larger matter of Lincoln declining to assign another general to oversee affairs in the theater, instead taking on that momentous responsibility himself.

With their ample illustration of city and town locations, rail and road networks, rivers, and other key terrain features, ten maps assist the reader in visualizing the situations at hand and the options available. Seven additional maps are attached to the extensive driving tour. The tour, which is focused upon visiting sites directly related to the critical decisions explored earlier, is an important facet of all series volumes.

Seeing this series installment come from Robert Tanner was a pleasant surprise given the amount of time that has elapsed since his last book-length publication. His Stonewall in the Valley, a major work mostly examining the campaign from the Confederate perspective, was first published way back in 1976 and was re-released in a revised edition in 1996. That was followed in 2001 by the conversation-inspiring analytical study Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered. In the Acknowledgments section of this book, Tanner notes that he cold-called Command Decisions in America's Civil War series creator Matt Spruill with a proposal for a 1862 Valley Campaign volume, so it's nice to see the series having the prestige and capability of getting a subject matter expert who had been away from publishing for quite some time to 'get back in the game' (so to speak). The result of that is one of the very best volumes the series has to offer.

Sunday, March 10, 2024

Booknotes: Campaigns of a Non-Combatant

New Arrival:

Campaigns of a Non-Combatant: The Memoir of a Civil War Correspondent by George A. Townsend, ed. by Jeffrey R. Biggs (Hardtack Bks, 2024).

From the description: "George Alfred Townsend was a special war correspondent for the Philadelphia Press and New York Herald during the Civil War. He followed McClellan’s Army of the Potomac and Pope’s Army of Virginia in the spring and summer of 1862, filing dozens of dispatches to his editors. Finally, after suffering from the effects of ‘swamp fever,’ he took a two-year break in Europe, where he lectured about his experiences. Townsend returned to the war front in 1865 and - after taking the pen name of “GATH” - was the first correspondent to describe the war’s climax at Five Forks. He released his memoir in 1866, detailing his personal experiences and recollections of the Civil War and those dramatic days."

In this new edition, editor Jeffrey Biggs revises Townsend's 1866 memoir (excising the non-Civil War chapters), re-formats the text in a more attractive modern font, and reorganizes the original chapters into three parts as follows:
"Part One follows Townsend's journey from his assignment to the Pennsylvania Reserves on March 13, 1862 until he witnesses the Battle of Malvern Hill from Harrison's Landing and escapes aboard a hospital transport on July 1, 1862. Part Two begins with Townsend's assignment to the Army of Virginia, his arrival in Washington, D.C. on July 12, 1862, and takes us to the Battle of Cedar Mountain on August 7, 1862. Finally, Part Three, written in a more contemporary hand than the other parts, concludes Townsend's war correspondence with a story of the Appomattox Campaign, focusing on Phil Sheridan's victory at Five Forks and a visit to the ruined Confederate capital of Richmond" (xiv).

Biggs's Editor's Introduction provides a brief synopsis of Townsend's life and writing career, some background on the 1866 memoir, and discussion of his editorial process. Newly added period illustrations and photographs are peppered throughout, and the editor also indexes the material. The text is not heavily annotated. Pages are sporadically footnoted, with one to three notes found on those pages that have them. Biggs's self-stated goal is "not to alter the text of the original or even improve it but rather to introduce twenty-first century readers to the engaging work of a young, ambitious correspondent living through the most important events of his lifetime" (xiii).

Wednesday, March 6, 2024

Booknotes: From Frederick to Sharpsburg

New Arrival:

From Frederick to Sharpsburg: People, Places, and Events of the Maryland Campaign Before Antietam by Steven R. Stotelmyer (Antietam Inst, 2023).

In its own words, the Antietam Institute "is a member centered organization with a mission to educate the public on the critical importance of the Battle of Antietam and the 1862 Maryland Campaign," and book and journal publication is a major part of the mission. The institute's first two full-length publications were the reference works Brigades of Antietam and The Artillery of Antietam, and the latest, From Frederick to Sharpsburg: People, Places, and Events of the Maryland Campaign Before Antietam by certified Antietam Battlefield Guide Steven Stotelmyer, is a different kind of book.

I liked Stotelmyer's recent reevaluation of McClellan's role in the campaign in 2019's Too Useful to Sacrifice, and From Frederick to Sharpsburg is another essay anthology. It consists of seven long-form essays, the volume's title and subtitle offering a good sense of their content range. The combination of main essays and appendix section fill over 450 pages, so it's a hefty book.

The description found on the institute's website contains summary insights on essay content. Stotelmyer's opening essay contests the conventional understanding of how the citizens of Frederick, Maryland responded to the Confederate arrival at their town: "In the popular histories of the event the people of Maryland are portrayed as turning a cold shoulder towards the Confederates and their cause. Using primary accounts, Stotelmyer provides an exploration of the Confederate reception in Frederick in the early days of the Maryland Campaign and concludes it was not as unfriendly as traditionally portrayed."

The following essay revisits the Barbara Fritchie story: "Barbara Fritchie was a real person living in Frederick during the Maryland Campaign. She was made famous by a poem published in 1863 by John Greenleaf Whittier. Because she passed away shortly after the Maryland Campaign, Barbara never knew any of the fame generated by Whittier’s pen. As the story goes the 96-year-old Barbara defiantly waved an American flag in the face of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. In truth however, A Quaker poet who likely never saw the city or old lady, and a Confederate general who never saw either, poet or lady, made as fine an advertising project as any city could desire."

Other essay subjects include a major Confederate intelligence gaffe that the author feels is still overlooked, another return to the ever-controversial Special Orders No. 191, "The Legend of Wise's Well" (a mass grave of Confederates), the death of Union general Jesse Reno, and the "high command dysfunction" between Ambrose Burnside and Jacob Cox on the federal left at Antietam. Maps and photos abound, and source notes are helpfully placed at the bottom of each page. The appendix section (A-K in approximately 150 pages) is hefty as well. Those look at a great variety of topics, among them Lee's health, Fritchie's poetry, a number of September 9-13 battles associated with the campaign, the Reno monument, and more legends.

Obviously, I haven't read this yet, but it certainly has the look of something every Antietam enthusiast would want to add to the collection.

Monday, March 4, 2024

Review - "The World Will Never See the Like: The Gettysburg Reunion of 1913" John Hopkins

[The World Will Never See the Like: The Gettysburg Reunion of 1913 John L. Hopkins (Savas Beatie, 2024). Hardcover, photos, footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:x,182/208. ISBN:978-161121-684-4. $32.95]

In the summer of 1913, an estimated 53,000 elderly Civil War veterans in their 70s and 80s arrived at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania for a national commemoration of the great battle fought there fifty years earlier. Any honorably discharged veteran, blue or gray, was cheerfully invited to attend. What happened that late June to early July and the prodigious planning that went into staging such a grand event are eloquently recounted in John Hopkins's The World Will Never See the Like: The Gettysburg Reunion of 1913.

One might readily imagine the challenging logistical requirements of putting on an organized gathering of this scale in what was still a small town, and Hopkins offers an insightful survey of who made it a reality, from the cooperative efforts of businesses big and small, veteran groups, and other private organizations to local, state, and federal governments. The author traces how bickering among stubborn committee members and uncertain funding sources unnecessarily drew out the planning phase of the reunion (and on occasion even threatened cancellation), but everything came together in the end. Hopkins justly credits the U.S. Army for its deft management of much of the event's logistical and material needs. As Hopkins observes, that positive outcome did not go unnoticed or unappreciated. Indeed, the reunion's success went some way toward redeeming a reputation stained by the embarrassing disorganization and avoidable human health crises attendant to the army's mobilization during the Spanish-American War a decade and a half earlier.

Cornerstone placement, to be overseen in person by President Woodrow Wilson, of a massive peace memorial celebrating national reconciliation and the reunited country's prosperous present and future was intended to be a grand focus of the reunion, but congressional parsimony torpedoed the project. However, that disappointment could not detract from the heartfelt reconciliationist feeling that infused the entire event and its veteran participants. Against some early opposition to such concessions, organizers fostered good will by allowing ex-Confederates to wear gray uniforms, fly the battle flag under which they fought, and not have their defeat waved in their faces. Additionally, by generally avoiding the centrality of slavery when it came to discussing the root causes of the conflict and by not challenging certain Lost Cause tenets, most attendees and reporters alike generally smoothed over potential intersectional sticking points in favor of emphasizing commonality. Some who hoped to use the reunion to alter the established historical narrative of the battle itself would find only disappointment. For example, North Carolinians seeking their fair share of credit for the valor and sacrifice displayed during Pickett's Charge were unable to crack the edifice of the Virginia-centric historical story line.

Hopkins's text is regularly infused with vivid first-person accounts of the reunion, chief among them veteran perspectives and colorful newspaper reporter observations, all seamlessly incorporated into the main narrative and insightfully contextualized by the author. Citing in both text and footnotes the work of recent scholars of Civil War and Reconstruction-era historical remembrance and veteran studies (ex. the scholarship of David Blight, Nina Silber, Donald Shaffer, Barbara Gannon, Brian Matthew Jordan, and others), Hopkins synthesizes those findings with his own research into how veterans, visitors, reporters, and keynote speakers experienced and interpreted the event. It's unknown how many black veterans attended the reunion (according to Hopkins's research, press coverage of their presence was sparse), but Hopkins notes the presence of several black unit GAR encampments.

Not everything went smoothly (for example, establishments serving alcohol to eager imbibers were persistent thorns in the sides of those promoting order and decorum), but Hopkins persuasively maintains that organizing authorities could be justifiably proud of their efforts overall. One of the greatest achievements was the small number of deaths, a comparative handful weighed against the full expectation that hundreds might not survive either the long journey to and from the reunion, the physical exertions involved during the reunion, or the oppressive summer heat and humidity. Carloads of coffins thankfully went unused, and much credit goes to plentiful and well-organized health services, solicitous and highly ubiquitous attendants (the Boy Scouts of American deserve special mention on that score), and modern sanitation measures.

In addition to its coverage of the reunion's 4-day series of main events (each day having its own theme), the volume describes a number of more intimate unit reunions and interesting side stories. Among the latter is the book's tracing of the self-serving memorialization alliance forged between James Longstreet widow Helen Dortsch Longstreet and Army of the Potomac Third Corps commander Daniel Sickles. In engaging fashion, Hopkins dryly observes how the pair enthusiastically aided each other in preserving for the two controversial generals the most heroic Gettysburg reputation possible. Of course, the aspect of the reunion best known to modern Civil War readers is the famous reenactment of Pickett's Charge that took place and photographic images of the old vets shaking hands across the stone wall representing the alleged "High-Water Mark" of the Confederacy. As Hopkins amusingly relates, the reality of the how the reenactment unfolded, the order and direction of which dissolved completely in the face of massive pressing crowds of reporters and visiting onlookers, was far different from the chaos-free, stage-managed image of it presented by the photographers for posterity.

As Hopkins notes in his preface, major publications related to the 1913 reunion are few and far between, and Thomas Flagel's excellent War, Memory, and the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion (2019) [site review (7/24/19)] was hot off the press just as Hopkins was finishing his own manuscript. Coverage elements found in each book both reinforce and complement the other. Praise for the event's organizers and widespread gratitude expressed by veterans are substantial themes common to both studies, but Flagel's investigation, to a much greater degree than Hopkins's, emphasizes internal motivations and communal spirit as being more important to the visiting veterans than wider engagement with national issues and themes. Flagel also focuses his veteran profiling most deeply upon four individuals he sees as representative of the breadth of attitudes and motivations displayed by attendees. Hopkins elects instead to offer his readers a wide-lens, less microscopic approach to his multifold exploration of individual and group stories (though, to be fair, Flagel also surveys attendee experiences to some degree). Both elegant works are rather slender overviews, neither aspiring to exhaustive status, but taken together they present students of the Civil War era with a richly drawn description and meaningful understanding of one of the grandest commemorative events in our nation's history.

Thursday, February 29, 2024

Coming Soon (March '24 Edition)

Scheduled for MAR 20241:

J.E.B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man by Edward Longacre.
Tabernacles in the Wilderness: The US Christian Commission on the Civil War Battlefront by Rachel Williams.
Germantown during the Civil War Era: A Reversal of Fortune by George Browder.
The War That Made America: Essays Inspired by the Scholarship of Gary W. Gallagher ed. by Janney, Carmichael, and Dean.

Comments: Hardly a bumper crop, but there's always next month! As regular visitors to the site already know, the Stuart bio is out a bit early. Release dates from the publisher of the Germantown study are very often soft placeholders that do not get updated until they are passed, so I don't know if the Browder book will indeed be made available this month. The UTP website still has it as a mid-March release, so I included it here. The essay book honoring Gary Gallagher sounds interesting, and speaking of GG he will be a participant in tonight's ECW-sponsored round table discussion of issues related to the recent demise of the ACW and CWT magazines [follow this link for more info].

1 - These monthly release lists are not meant to be exhaustive compilations of non-fiction releases. They do not include reprints that are not significantly revised/expanded, special editions not distributed to reviewers, children's books, and digital-only titles. Works that only tangentially address the war years are also generally excluded. Inevitably, one or more titles on this list will get a rescheduled release (and they do not get repeated later), so revisiting the past few "Coming Soon" posts is the best way to pick up stragglers.

Tuesday, February 27, 2024

Booknotes: J.E.B. Stuart

New Arrival:

J.E.B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man by Edward G. Longacre (Savas Beatie, 2024).

Serious biographical coverage of the life and Civil War career of James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart is solid enough, though one would think the overall number produced would be more befitting of his historical popularity and stature. I haven't read the pre-Centennial titles from Thomason and Davis, but I have read Emory Thomas's Bold Dragoon (1986) way back when and Jeffry Wert's Cavalryman of the Lost Cause (2008). Thinking back on it, the long gap between Thomas and Wert is a bit puzzling, especially after considering the exciting state of Civil War publishing during the 1990s boom when the bays and shelves at B&N and Borders fairly sagged with a wonderful array of new and old releases.

Anyway, removing the nostalgia glasses and getting back to the present, Edward Longacre's J.E.B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man is out now for those interested in another full biography. Having no detailed recollection of Thomas's book (it's been waaaay too long since I read it), the marketing claim that Longacre's new book is "the first balanced, detailed, and thoroughly scrutinized study of the life and service of the Civil War’s most famous cavalryman" may be a fair assessment when weighed against the twentieth-century titles, but I thought Wert's 2008 bio was also more than sufficiently balanced, detailed, and thoughtful. Regardless, another up to date impression, particular one formulated by a subject-matter expert of Longacre's established record, is of course always welcome.

Longacre certainly aims to provide a 'warts and all' portrait of the impressively bearded general's Civil War career. At this point in time, every fair-minded observer should be willing to concede that Stuart displayed considerable gifts and abilities over his extensive tenure leading Confederate cavalry in Virginia, but he "also under-performed. On occasion, he underestimated his opponents, took unnecessary risks with his habitually understrength command, failed to properly discipline and motivate his troopers, and was prone to errors both strategic and tactical." His performance during the Gettysburg Campaign has always provided his critics with the most fodder for complaint. There, his "wayward route to the battlefield deprived Lee of the ability to safely negotiate his path toward a climactic confrontation with the Union Army of the Potomac. Because of his outsized wartime reputation—one embellished in the century-and-a-half since—most of Stuart’s errors have passed virtually unnoticed or, when addressed, have been excused or explained away in some fashion."

More from the description: Longacre's J.E.B. Stuart "is based on hundreds of published works, archival sources, and newspapers. He probes not only Stuart’s military career but elements of his character and personality that invite investigation. Even the man’s fiercest partisans admitted that he was vain and inordinately sensitive to criticism, with a curious streak of immaturity—at times the hard-edged veteran, at other times a devotee of the pageantry of war, given to affectations such as ostrich-plumed hats, golden spurs, and the headquarters musicians who accompanied him on the march. Ever motivated by appeals to vanity, he curried the patronage of powerful men and responded readily to the attentions of attractive women even though by 1861, he was a long-married man."

In sum: "Personal flaws and limitations aside, Stuart was popular with his officers and men, beloved by members of his staff, and considered by the people of his state and region the beau ideal of Confederate soldiery. The distinction endures today." This book "is an attempt to determine its validity." I would say that there's more than an even chance that I'll get to this one.

Monday, February 26, 2024

Booknotes: The Old War Horse

New Arrival:

The Old War Horse: The USS Benton on Western Waters, 1853-1865 by Myron J. Smith, Jr. (McFarland, 2024).

Though they looked roughly similar from afar and shared a common construction thread in the personage of talented and successful engineer, inventor, and businessman James B. Eads, the origins of the ironclad gunboat USS Benton were very different from those of the famous City Class ironclads. In contrast to the City Class vessels, which were purpose built from the keel up, the Benton was one of the Civil War's great many naval conversion jobs, it being an Eads-owned riverboat salvage catamaran prior to the war. Its full story is the subject of Myron Smith's latest comprehensive Civil War ship history The Old War Horse: The USS Benton on Western Waters, 1853-1865.

A major part of the study, four chapters, is devoted to the prewar history of what would become the Benton, including its original design and purpose, its "tumultuous government acquisition process," and the hull's conversion into a powerful ironclad. Of course, everyone steeped in the literature of the Mississippi River Valley campaigns will have encountered the Benton on innumerable occasions during their readings. Smith's study has lengthy chapters discussing the Benton's involvement in the Island No. 10, Memphis, Vicksburg, and Red River campaigns along with its role in opposing the wild breakout run of the CSS Arkansas. The book ends with the Benton's decommissioning and ultimate scrap yard dismantlement.

Thursday, February 22, 2024

Review - "The Folly and the Madness: The Civil War Letters of Captain Orlando S. Palmer, Fifteenth Arkansas Infantry" edited by Thomas Cutrer

[The Folly and the Madness: The Civil War Letters of Captain Orlando S. Palmer, Fifteenth Arkansas Infantry edited by Thomas W. Cutrer (University of Tennessee Press, 2023). Softcover, 4 maps, photos, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:154/230. ISBN:978-1-62190-841-8. $39]

The Folly and the Madness: The Civil War Letters of Captain Orlando S. Palmer, Fifteenth Arkansas Infantry is a recent installment from University of Tennessee Press's venerable Voices of the Civil War series. In the main, the volume consists of secession period and wartime letters from lawyer and Civil War officer Orlando Palmer (1833-1864) to his younger sister Artimisia Palmer. The experience of being orphaned relatively early in life (Orlando was eleven when his father died, and the pair's mother passed away six years later) seems to have fostered a very tight emotional bond between the two. Orlando's letters to Missie (as his sister was called) are consistently encouraging and deeply solicitous of her welfare.

As explained in editor Thomas Cutrer's introduction, the Palmers were raised in northern Alabama near the border with Tennessee. When Orlando moved away, first to briefly attend Cumberland School of Law in Tennessee and then to start his professional career in Des Arc, Arkansas, Artimisia lived with their grandparents in Florence, Alabama. In addition to filling in background information and context for the letters that follow, Cutrer also introduces readers to the Palmer's extended family network, which is helpful as he uses the letters of first cousin Oliver Kennedy to fill in some of the considerable time and content gaps in the Palmer correspondence. Though Orlando displays some sympathies with Fire-eater politics and joined a local militia company for presumably more than just social reasons, he did not look forward to nor did he anticipate war between the sections, which he deemed "folly" and "madness." After tidying up his law practice affairs, he enlisted in what would become the Fifteenth Arkansas Volunteer Infantry. No doubt influenced by his education, background, and rising reputation in the legal field, administrative postings took Palmer out of the ranks and into brigade headquarters. Indeed, he was employed by a succession of generals, his roles including secretary to William J. Hardee and brigade adjutant to Sterling A.M. Wood and successor Mark Lowrey.

Though ground-level military perspectives are obviously narrow with very limited knowledge of larger affairs, the opinions of intelligent lower-ranking officers regarding superior officers in the same army are always interesting to read. While Palmer does not describe his adjutant duties to his sister in any detail, his headquarters positions presumably afforded him some personal access to the higher echelons of western theater generals. Palmer's very negative first impression of Hardee's haughty treatment of him as the general's personal secretary was quickly replaced by esteem. Beyond the Arkansas connection, it should come as no surprise that Patrick Cleburne is described in glowing terms. Though one wishes he had explained his views in more depth, Palmer positively gushes about Simon Bolivar Buckner, proclaiming him to be the officer that he prefers over all others. Presumably that opinion grew out of personal interactions or observations made during the prolonged early-war occupation of Bowling Green, Kentucky. Palmer also viewed Army of Tennessee commander Braxton Bragg as a competent leader and expressed no wish to join that general's list of abusers and detractors that grew as the war progressed. Even after the disaster at Chattanooga, not a single negative word about Bragg's leadership can be found in Palmer's letters, only confidence in the future. This reinforces the research conclusions of recent biographer Earl Hess and others before him who have strongly challenged the traditional notion in the literature that Bragg was deeply unpopular. Somewhat curiously, beyond general comments expressing how agreeable their working and personal relationships were, Palmer writes relatively little about Brig. Gen. S.A.M. Wood, the man whom he directly served in the capacity of brigade adjutant before Wood resigned between Chickamauga and Chattanooga (and was replaced by newly promoted general Mark Lowrey, who kept Palmer on in the same post).

As mentioned before, there are significant gaps in Palmer's correspondence, and Cutrer gamely tries to fill them with letters from family members, most prominently a first cousin named Oliver Kennedy. One particularly lengthy gap (which filled much of 1862) was between Bowling Green and the aftermath of the 1862 Kentucky Campaign. Palmer's serious leg wound suffered at Shiloh was undoubtedly a major factor in making letter writing less of a priority, but it is unfortunate to have no letters from such a critical, event-filled period. In fact, Palmer's body of correspondence consistently leaves large gaps around major movements and battles, which is understandable on his part but frustrating for future readers. For example, it is unfortunate that Palmer, who correctly anticipated that Union Army of the Cumberland commander William S. Rosecrans would attempt to outflank Tullahoma's built-up defenses, did not write about the actual campaign of maneuver once it started nor did he describe for his sister the pitched battle at Chickamauga that followed it. Though it's possible such letters once existed, it is October 1863 before known correspondence from Palmer picks up again. He does offer some brief observations regarding the fighting experiences of his own brigade and division at Tunnel Hill and Ringgold, but once again demurs when it comes to offering more detailed information. Anticipating his sister's interest in the battle fought and lost along Missionary Ridge, Palmer offers the common refrain ["I am not prepared to give you a general description of the battle, not being sufficiently informed to do so with any satisfaction" (pg. 129)]. A few letters follow from the period of the 1864 Atlanta Campaign, most notably a short description of the June 27 fight at Kennesaw Mountain. Palmer's letter writing campaign ended on June 29, with no surviving correspondence existing between that day and his death in action five months later during the November 30, 1864 assault at Franklin.

Due to what would quickly become a permanent detachment from his regiment to brigade headquarters, the Palmer letters as a whole will not greatly satisfy readers hoping to find an extensive personal record of wartime service with the 15th Arkansas. The letters contain a great deal of the typical content found in Civil War correspondence, including descriptions of personal health, inquiries about the well-being of extended family members, news from home, and gossip. A unique facet of Orlando Palmer's letters are his continual attempts at assuaging his sister's melancholy, the mindful tenderness and frequency of which leads the editor to surmise that Missie suffered from what we might diagnose today as clinical depression (though we can never know that for certain). Courtship rituals and behavioral mores regarding relations between men and women are also common subjects of discussion, prodigious commentary and advice apparently coming from both sides of the letter exchange. Palmer also repeatedly enjoins his sister to expand her horizons of independence.

In terms of editorial duties, Cutrer contributes the aforementioned chapter-length introduction and helps bridge the more extended time gaps with helpful contextual narrative. Additional context can be found in the volume's frequently lengthy explanatory endnotes. In this particular collection of soldier letters, cultural and societal insights outnumber military ones, but it's a solid entry in a series that always manages to sustain its reputation for masterful curation of Civil War primary source materials.

Monday, February 19, 2024

Booknotes: Thunder in the Harbor

New Arrival:

Thunder in the Harbor: Fort Sumter and the Civil War by Richard W. Hatcher, III (Savas Beatie, 2024).

The crisis that developed around Fort Sumter during the momentous "Secession Winter" of 1860-61 and the bombardment and surrender of the Charleston Harbor facility in April 1861 have been explored in several full-length studies, some of them quite good. Richard Hatcher's Thunder in the Harbor: Fort Sumter and the Civil War, however, extends the fort's history through the rest of the conflict and beyond. Indeed, Hatcher recounts the entire active history of the fort, from initial construction through the aftermath of World War Two. In 1948, the fort was formally incorporated into the NPS as Fort Sumter National Monument.

While the intensity of federal land and sea assaults against it waxed and waned, Fort Sumter was under Union guns for almost the entire duration of the war. From the description: "After its surrender, Southern troops immediately occupied and improved Sumter’s defenses. The U.S. blockaded Charleston Harbor and for two years the fort, with its 84 heavy guns and a 500-man garrison, remained mostly untested. That changed in July 1863 when a powerful combined operation set its sights on the fort, Charleston, and its outer defenses. The result was a grueling 22-month land and sea siege—the longest of the Civil War. The complex effort included ironclad attacks, land assaults, raiding parties, and siege operations. Some of the war’s most famous events unfolded there, including the assault against Battery Wagner, led by the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (depicted in the movie Glory), the shelling of the city by the “Swamp Angel,” and the beginning of submarine warfare when the H. L. Hunley sank the USS Housatonic and was herself lost at sea. The destruction of Fort Sumter remained a key Federal objective throughout the siege. Despite repeated concentrated bombardments of the fort and the city, Sumter never fell." Of course, all of those events are covered in the book.

Federal control of Fort Sumter resumed in February 1865, only after Charleston itself was evacuated by Confederate forces in the face of Sherman's approaching army. The campaign against the "Cradle of Secession" was the longest of the war. More from the description: "Hatcher, the former historian at Fort Sumter Fort Moultrie National Historical Park, mined a host of primary sources to produce an in-depth and fascinating account of the intricacies, complexities, and importance of this campaign to the overall war effort."

But the book doesn't end there. After the conclusion of the Civil War, Sumter continued to the serve the government. More: "During the eight decades that followed, the United States invested millions of dollars and thousands of hours rebuilding and rearming the fort to face potential foreign threats in three different wars. By the end of World War II, sea and air power had made Sumter obsolete, and the fort was transferred to the National Park Service."

Friday, February 16, 2024

Review - "Yankee Commandos: How William P. Sanders Led a Cavalry Squadron Deep into Confederate Territory" by Stuart Brandes

[Yankee Commandos: How William P. Sanders Led a Cavalry Squadron Deep into Confederate Territory by Stuart D. Brandes (University of Tennessee Press, 2023). Hardcover, 7 maps, photos, illustrations, chronology, notes, appendix section, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xi,205/329. ISBN978-1-62190-746-6. $34.95]

It is difficult to understate the significance of Tennessee's white Unionists and their armed contributions to victory in the West from beginning to end. Taken together, they contributed to federal ranks what amounted to an entire mid-sized field army. Roughly three-quarters of those individuals (an estimated 30,000 organized fighting men) hailed from rugged East Tennessee, where the majority of the population remained fiercely loyal to the United States government. Dedicated to liberating their homes and punishing secessionists on both battlefield and civilian fronts, those men were highly motivated soldiers wherever they fought. Immediately recognizing this large wellspring of loyalism in the heart of the Confederacy and receptive to their cries for help, President Lincoln very early on in the war enjoined his military commanders to come up with a plan to succor the population through invasion and occupation. Initially conciliatory, Confederate authorities cracked down on dissent after a failed autumn 1861 uprising that included an extensive bridge-burning campaign, and later on conscription agents further drove thousands of fighting age men across the mountains and into federal recruitment camps in Kentucky. Despite continuous promises of relief, the pro-Union population could only look on in frustration over the first half of the war as logistical concerns and shifting strategic priorities repeatedly postponed federal plans for occupying East Tennessee.

Finally, in the spring of 1863 Major General Ambrose Burnside was in the process of assembling his new Army of the Ohio for a major relief campaign, the plan being to pour through the mountain gaps along the Kentucky-Tennessee border and capture Knoxville, the East Tennessee region's principal urban center. Unfortunately for the locals, that long-anticipated movement was yet again aborted, with the Ninth Corps (half the expedition's manpower) ordered to Mississippi in June to bolster U.S. Grant's army besieging Vicksburg. In the meantime, while waiting for the return of his borrowed troops and resumption of the campaign, Burnside ordered a cavalry raid into East Tennessee. The general hoped that a bold incursion there would serve as a morale boost to the population while at the same time damaging Confederate transportation and communications infrastructure in ways that would facilitate his expected follow-on campaign. The history of the resulting June 14-24, 1863 raid is recounted in full for the first time by Stuart Brandes in his book Yankee Commandos: How William P. Sanders Led a Cavalry Squadron Deep into Confederate Territory.

The man selected to lead the mission was 29-year-old Colonel William P. Sanders, a highly regarded up-and-comer in the leadership ranks of Union cavalry officers. Born in Kentucky, Sanders's slaveholding family later moved to Natchez, Mississippi. Young Sanders graduated from West Point in 1856 with a rather mediocre record, was assigned to the 2nd Dragoons in the West, and resided in California when war broke out in 1861. As Brandes relates in the book, those who knew him remarked that Sanders regularly displayed strong southern sympathies, which would not have been unusual for someone of his upbringing. What was unexpected by many what that he stayed in the U.S. Army. Given his age and social background, he might have been expected to resign his commission and 'go South' but didn't. No surviving letters share his thinking on the matter. Brandes's research did not uncover any documents within which Sanders either explained his reasoning or discussed any conflicting views on loyalty he might have held. Forced to read between the lines, the author reasonably posits that Sanders's decade removed from the Deep South and his immediate family's broken ties with the region (through marriage and geographical relocation to free state California) combined with his U.S. Army service to cement Sanders's national loyalties.

Sanders's brigade-sized command that was assigned to conduct the raid consisted of a select group of approximately 1,500 Tennessee, Ohio, Illinois, and Kentucky men drawn from six mounted regiments. Anticipating the difficulties involved in traversing rugged mountain trails, only a single artillery section accompanied the raiders. You don't have to be a stickler for accuracy to wonder why the author repeatedly refers to Sanders's ad-hoc raiding column as being a "squadron" (which is two companies by the U.S. cavalry's organizational terminology of the period, in practice between 100 and 200 men) but it's best to not get too hung up on that particular semantic quirk.

Overall, Brandes does a very fine job of constructing a Civil War cavalry raid narrative, seamlessly weaving numerous participant and observer accounts into his text's meticulous recounting of events. In the opening stage of the raid, Sanders was gifted with good fortune when his Confederate opponents left a poorly guarded gap in their front-line screen at Wartburg. That inexcusable oversight allowed Sanders to make it all the way to the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad and its critically important Loudon Bridge (the raid's chief objective) without any major roadblocks or fighting. Finding the huge bridge fortified and well-defended, Sanders prudently declined to attack yet was determined to press on with the raid. On June 20, he feinted against and skirted around the Knoxville defenses. Pressing beyond Knoxville, Sanders and his men destroyed the massive, state of the art bridge built at Strawberry Plains. After destroying another important bridge at Mossy Creek, Sanders sensed that the jig was up and turned back toward Kentucky. That final stage of the raid was not without incident, however, as converging Confederate pursuers and blocking forces compelled Sanders to spike and abandon his artillery and break up his command into small groups in order to escape across the mountains.

In addition to closely following the movements of Sanders and his men, the text provides a full picture of the Confederate response to the raid and the challenges they experienced in attempting to thwart it. Brandes is justly critical of Brigadier General John Pegram's failure to maintain an effective screen across his geographical area of responsibility, which included Wartburg. Generally speaking, East Tennessee department commander Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner conducted himself in reasonable fashion, having little choice but to take calculated risks as he could not afford to abandon the mountain screen in favor of concentrating overwhelming force against Sanders. As Brandes details in the book, Buckner's most disreputable action was his post-raid attempt to scapegoat Brigadier General John Frazer, the Cumberland Gap commander and the principal subordinate arguably least responsible for the most critical defect in the Confederate defensive screen.

Brandes rates the Sanders Raid a success and that conclusion is difficult to dispute. Strawberry Plains was the movement's most significant achievement, but the raiders also destroyed two other important bridges of lesser size. While Sanders was forced to abandon his artillery section and his men were largely scattered by the end of the raid, actual casualties were very low (at least by official count). The side objective of showing the flag and raising the spirits of the pro-Union population also seems to have been well achieved, as the author highlights innumerable incidents of celebratory acts and examples of cheerful assistance from friendly civilians all along the raid's path.

In assessing which factors contributed most to that success, the author's analysis offers a number of insights. As became standard practice during the war, Burnside directed that diversionary operations be conducted to confuse the enemy as to the raid's path and target, and the probes led by Col. August Kautz and Gen. Julius White fulfilled those purposes. Assisted by the aforementioned Confederate mistakes and their need to closely guard numerous fixed points, Sanders also helped his own case by employing speed and misdirection in both bypassing strongpoints and overcoming token garrisons. Information was another key to success, as civilian guides and local knowledge possessed within his own command (roughly half of the raiders were East Tennesseans) kept Sanders accurately and abundantly informed as to road/trail directions and enemy dispositions. Brandes consistently lauds Sanders's decisive and effective leadership, but he can be critical when warranted. For example, at two points Sanders endangered his own rear guard detachment by neglecting to assign a guide or otherwise mark a path for those men to rejoin the main body.

A brief epilogue describes the few months remaining in Sanders's life, including his death in action on the skirmish line during James Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign. Brandes's study is the first to truly invite a full consideration of the life and Civil War career of William Sanders. During that process, one might also ponder what might have been had he lived. Given the independent leadership displayed during the East Tennessee raid and the confidence his superiors had in his abilities (though unconfirmed by the Senate, he was appointed acting brigadier general before his death), it seems possible to imagine Sanders leading a mounted division at some point during the subsequent Atlanta, March to the Sea, Middle Tennessee, and Carolinas campaigns or during James Wilson's 1865 Raid through Alabama and Georgia.

Yankee Commandos is worthy of recommendation for a number of reasons. The past few decades have witnessed a great upsurge in the number and quality of Civil War raid histories, and Stuart Brandes's work admirably fills in one of the remaining gaps in that coverage. The volume also significantly enhances the larger Southern Unionist literature by highlighting one of the numerous notable military contributions spearheaded by the homegrown southern opposition to the Confederate experiment. Finally, a detailed, book-length account of the Army of the Ohio's 1863 campaign to secure East Tennessee is still lacking, and Brandes's study of the Sanders Raid will stand as a vital companion to such a work, if one is ever created.

Wednesday, February 14, 2024

Booknotes: Our People Are Warlike

New Arrival:

Our People Are Warlike: Civil War Pittsburgh and Home-Front Mobilization by Allen Christopher York (U Tenn Press, 2023).

When you operate a book review site for nearly two decades, you really notice how faddish Civil War publishing can be. While the popularity of Civil War urban studies may have faded a bit from wider view, examples continue to pop up on occasion. One released last year is Allen York's Our People Are Warlike: Civil War Pittsburgh and Home-Front Mobilization.

As the subtitle suggests, emphasis is placed on the city's mobilization of people and resources. According to York, Pittsburgh was united in its "overwhelmingly pro-Union fervor—which cut across class, ethnic, and gender lines" and "mobilized the city for the war effort."

From the description: "From its establishment as a frontier village, Pittsburgh evolved on a cultural path divergent from that of both the Northeast and the towns developing farther west. The city entered the war with close economic ties to the East, West, and South, yet also stood apart from them—too small to assume the political positions of cities like New York or Philadelphia that represented greater ethnic and class conflict and much greater tension over secession—yet large enough to manifest the complex institutions and systems of an urban center."

At less than 150 pages of main narrative, the volume is of readily digestible size. It is organized by theme, its seven chapters comprising "an exploration of Pittsburgh's reaction to the secession crisis of 1860-1861, the presence of soldiers and the threat of invasions, wartime industries, the introduction of conscription and emancipation to the war, the care of soldiers on the home front and front lines, and the devastating loss experienced throughout the war" (pg. 8).

More: "This book represents a significant contribution to the scholarship of both the Civil War and the city of Pittsburgh, adding to the growing historiography of regional and community studies of the war. With abundant illustrations of local people and places, research on Pittsburgh’s geographic importance and extensive industrial output, this book also provides compelling details on Black citizens’ efforts to oppose slavery, ultimately through their service in the Union Army. Civil War Pittsburgh was unique: its distinctive geography, politics, and economy set the conditions for ordinary citizens to directly participate in the war in myriad ways that connected the experiences of the battlefield and the home front."

Monday, February 12, 2024

Booknotes: The Cassville Affairs

New Arrival:

The Cassville Affairs: Johnston, Hood, and the Failed Confederate Strategy in the Atlanta Campaign, 19 May 1864 by Robert D. Jenkins, Sr. (Mercer UP, 2024).

With a title like The Cassville Affairs you're getting either a very British Cold War spy drama starring Michael Caine or a new look at an important and controversial episode in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign. Thankfully, at least for our purposes here, we are getting the latter. The Cassville Affairs: Johnston, Hood, and the Failed Confederate Strategy in the Atlanta Campaign, 19 May 1864 is the third 1864 North Georgia campaign study from attorney, author, and battlefield preservationist Robert Jenkins, the first two of which [here and here] addressed in great detail the period between the end of Kennesaw Mountain and the indecisive result of the Battle of Peach Tree Creek.

A major battle was planned by Confederate Army of Tennessee commander Joseph E. Johnston for May 19. During it, Johnston expected to hurl the greatest portion of his army against a vulnerable segment of William T. Sherman's advancing army group. The expected offensive miscarried when corps commander John Bell Hood, who held the Confederate right, spied approaching Union forces of unknown size beyond the army's flank, suspended his attack, and notified Johnston of the unexpected state of affairs. Johnston then made the decision to retire the Confederate army southward and take up a new ridge-top defensive position. Johnston wanted to make a stand there, but two of his corps commanders (Hood and Leonidas Polk) insisted that enfilading fire from Union artillery rendered the new line indefensible. Disappointed at their attitude, Johnston determined to retreat once again. However, not every major player involved in the distressing happenings of May 19 agreed with Johnston's version of events.

From the description: "Civil War historians have remained baffled over the Cassville controversies for the past 150 plus years. There are two versions of events: Confederate commanding General Joseph E. Johnston's story, and Lieutenant General John Bell Hood's story." On May 19 there "were two critical decisions that the Confederate leadership faced at Cassville: first, whether to attack a portion of the Federal army in the morning; and second, once the morning attack was no longer feasible, whether to stay and fight the next day. Both decisions were the responsibility of Johnston, and both decisions involved advice and assistance by Hood. Johnston issued a General Order to all soldiers that morning proclaiming that the army had fallen back enough and would now turn and face the enemy. After a series of unforeseen circumstances, however, the Southern commander withdrew without a fight."

In supporting its detailed text, the volume does not skimp on visual aids. With 21 originals and 16 others reproduced from previously published sources, the map collection is particularly impressive.

Predictably, given the personalities involved and the gravity of what occurred, the Cassville blame game was both heated and prolonged. More from the description: "Before the war even concluded, Johnston and Hood began finger-pointing as they wrote their own versions of what happened that day. Since then, historians have been scratching their heads as to who was telling the truth, or if either one was honest." With its "new revelations," The Cassville Affairs "promises to change our understanding of the events surrounding the Cassville controversies and close the gap in its history."